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POSITIVISM, EMERGENT 
AND TRIUMPHANT 
Vincent A. Wellman* 
LEGAL PosITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE. By Anthony 
Sebok. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 327. 
$59.95. 
"Positivism" is one of those words that triggers passionate and 
often contradictory responses. For some, positivism is a pejorative.1 
Lon Fuller, perhaps more than anyone, charged that positivism was 
confused about the nature of law, blind to law's inherent morality, 
and morally corrupting to boot.2 He even suggested, in different 
ways, that positivism helped promote the rise of fascism in Europe.3 
Others, in contrast, have treated positivism as a modest and 
undeniable truth about law. Law, they argued, is morally fallible, 
and accordingly, the existence and validity of law is a matter of so­
cial fact rather than moral necessity. H.L.A. Hart, in particular, of­
fered this perspective.4 Building on the arguments of Austin and 
Bentham, his British predecessors, he characterized positivism in 
ways that took it less as a theory of law by itself than as a starting 
point for developing a satisfactory theory.5 Attributing to positiv-
* Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School; J.D. 1980, Yale Law School. 
- Ed. 
1. This fact about the history of positivism's "reputation" was examined recently in 
Frederick Schauer, Positivism as Pariah, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: EssA YS ON LEGAL 
PosmvxsM 31 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) [hereinafter AUTONOMY]. 
2. Fuller developed these criticisms in a number of writings, over a series of years. See, 
e.g., LoN L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); LoN FULLER, THE MORALITY OF 
LAW (rev. ed. 1969); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor 
Hart, 71 HAR.v. L. REv. 630 (1958) [hereinafter Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law]. 
3. See, e.g., Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, supra note 2. 
4. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 
593, 599 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism]. What both Austin and Bentham were anxious 
to assert were the following two simple things: first, in the absence of an expressed constitu· 
tional or legal provision, it could not follow from the mere fact that a rule violated standards 
of morality that it was not a rule of law; and conversely, it could not follow from the mere 
fact that a rule was morally desirable that it was a rule of law. 
It is useful, in this connection, to observe that in building his own affirmative theory of the 
nature of law and adjudication, Hart delayed discussing the natural law-legal positivism di­
vide until after he had laid the foundations of his claim that law is a system of rules. See 
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 181-207 (1st ed. 1961); see also id. at 6-13. This indi­
cates, along with other facets of his book, that Hart saw the separability thesis as independent 
of questions about the nature of legal systems. 
5. See Hart, Positivism, supra note 4, at 601 n.25 (distinguishing five different ideas attrib­
uted to positivism and arguing that only some were held by Austin and Bentham). 
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ism anything more substantial than this, Hart suggested, would risk 
both misperceptions about law's nature and also confusions about 
our political and legal obligations.6 
In terms that are important for appreciating Anthony Sebok's7 
enterprise, those who have followed Hart's lead take positivism to 
offer only a "thin" theory.8 That is, positivism involves little more 
than the apparently simple claim that there is no necessary or logi­
cal connection between law and morality.9 This claim, now 
standardly called the separability thesis, 10 does not by itself entail 
any particular position about the nature of law or about the nature 
of judicial decisionmaking.11 Theories about those topics need to 
be developed, on this approach to positivism, in order to complete 
our understanding of the nature of law; the separability thesis 
means only that it cannot be a precondition for the adequacy of 
such theories that law, or legal rules, must always be moral. Fuller's 
denigration of positivism, on the other hand, assumed that positiv­
ism is a "thick" theory, entailing deep but profoundly mistaken 
views about the nature of law and adjudication and the fundamen­
tal morality of both.12 This thick theory of positivism should be 
rejected, Fuller maintained, because its concomiiant positions on 
the nature of law and adjudication are both wrong and pernicious. 
Anthony Sebok rejects both these perspectives, at least as re­
gards positivism as it has been found in American legal theory of 
the last century. Fuller was wrong, Sebok maintains (pp. 46-47, 
160-69), because he conflated positivism's core tenets with some of 
the mistaken ideas of Austin and Hobbes. But, ' Sebok argues (pp. 
18-19), positivism is thicker than H.L.A. Hart's successors have 
acknowledged. Properly understood, it involves a complex set of 
commitments, especially as concerns the nature of judicial decision­
making. Thus, Sebok's argument proceeds on two levels. One 
involves an argument (pp. 6, 18-19, 267-317) for what is now called 
incorporationism, or sometimes inclusivist positivism.13 This is an 
6. See id. at 606-15 (rejecting the argument that positivism requires a formalist theory of 
adjudication); id. at 615-21 (discussing post-Nazi cases involving "grudge informers" who· 
were punished retroactively). 
7. Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School 
8. See, e.g., pp. 18-19. AJ;, Sebok notes, these descriptors were first used by Kent 
Greenawalt See p. 19 n.41 (citing Kent Greenawalt, Too Thin and Too Rich: Distinguishing 
Features of Legal Positivism, in AUTONOMY, supra note 1, at 1). 
9. This claim is far less simple than meets the eye. See David Lyons, Moral Aspects of 
Legal Theory, in 7 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 223, 245 (Peter A. French et al. eds., 
1982). 
10. See, e.g., p. 30. 
11. See Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982). 
12. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, supra note 2, passim 
13. See, e.g., Jules Coleman, Authority and Reason, in AUTONOMY, supra note 1, at 287, 
287-88. 
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inquiry in philosophy of law, advancing incorporationism as against 
both natural law and also a competing brand of positivism that is 
usually termed exclusivism, or nonincorporationism. At the other 
level, Sebok is developing a thesis of intellectual history, interpret­
ing the twists and turns of twentieth-century American jurispru­
dence in ways that are fresh and challenging. His focus at this 
second level is also called "positivism," but in this context what he 
means is better understood as a theory of adjudication rather than a 
claim about philosophy of law. In particular, Sebok aims to rehabil­
itate the theory of adjudication which was propounded by Henry 
Hart and Albert Sacks in their influential manuscript from the 
1950s, The Legal Process.14 As Sebok views it, Hart and Sacks's 
theory is underappreciated today because, soon after it emerged, it 
was usurped by conservative critics of the Warren Court, who used 
it to advance a political agenda that is alien to the Legal Process 
theory of adjudication.ts 
What links these two levels of argument is a claim about the 
goals, and virtues, of positivism: positivist theories, according to 
Sebok, seek to develop a theory of law that both accommodates 
and controls judicial discretion.16 The contribution of Hart and 
Sacks to this project is to offer a theory of adjudication that incor­
porates principles (some of them moral) as part of a complex mech­
anism for controlling judicial discretion. The contribution of 
incorporationism is to show that it is possible, consistent with legal 
positivism's basic tenets, to include moral principles in a theory of 
adjudication without falling into some kind of natural law position. 
The result is a rich and complex exploration of the development, in 
twentieth-century American legal theory, of the theory (or theo­
ries) called positivism. By my lights, Sebok is more successful in his 
argument about intellectual history and especially the hijacking of 
Hart and Sacks, than in his argument to connect these develop­
ments with the incorporationism debate in philosophy of law. But, 
at every level, this is an admirable piece of work, rich in detail and 
elegant in its design. Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence is 
a book that I will long remember and draw from in my own think­
ing about these issues. 
14. HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) [hereinafter TLP]. 
15. See pp. 179-216 ("The False Choice Between the Warren Court and Legal Process"). 
16. P. 17 ("[L]egal positivism tries to understand law as a system of variably constrained 
discretion. The positivist recognizes that the law sometimes requires the judge to exercise 
significant amounts of discretion but distinguishes judicial discretion from sovereign power 
by tethering the delegation of judicial discretion to the law itself."). 
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THE TRIUMPH OF lNCORPORATIONISM 
It is useful to begin with the argument about positivism's philo­
sophical commitments, although I regard this as the less impressive 
part of Sebok's enterprise. For some time, philosophy of law has 
tended to regard natural law and legal positivism as opposed and 
incompatible philosophical approaches to law.17 Along these lines, 
many positivists distinguish their approach from that of natural law 
by reference to the separability thesis: to accept that thesis means 
that positivism denies, but natural law affirms, that there is some 
necessary, or logical, connection between law and morality. Positiv­
ism, on this formulation, allows that some (even most) legal systems 
might exhibit a connection with morality, because of some fact of, 
say, the history of those legal systems or perhaps of their particular 
constitution. But law and morality are still importantly distinct, so 
that there could well be laws or legal systems, properly so called, 
which are morally deficient. 
While the core idea of the separability thesis can be found in 
H.L.A. Hart's seminal 1958 essay, Positivism and the Separation of 
Law and Morals, 18 both the term "separability thesis" and the 
idea's centrality to positivism owe to Jules Coleman's important es­
say in 1982, Negative and Positive Positivism.19 Coleman's under­
standing of positivism allows that moral principles might be part of 
the law of some legal system, and it is this version of positivism that 
Sebok aims to defend. The alternative view, based on the views of 
Joseph Raz, rejects the idea that moral principles can be properly 
p art of the legal system and hence is called "non­
incorporationism," or "exclusivism."20 On Raz's view, moral prin­
ciples can be factors in certain judicial decisions but not part of the 
law. 
The status of moral principles has been a recurring problem for 
positivism. The most forceful and elegant arguments about such 
principles have been advanced by Ronald Dworkin in a series of 
essays challenging positivism.21 When deciding "hard" cases, 
17. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241, 242 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) 
("[P]ositivists and natural lawyers are treated as a contrasting pair.'1). 
18. Hart, Positivism, supra note 4. 
19. Coleman, supra note 10. 
20. As Sebok observes, Frederick Schauer has also advanced a nonincorporationist 
version of positivism which he has termed "presumptive positivism.'' See, e.g., Frederick 
Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARVARD J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 645, 678-79 {1991). 
Sebok discusses Schauer's arguments, see, e.g., pp. 277-87, but since the crux of Sebok's argu­
ment has to do with the role of legal principles, and since Sebok himself views Schauer's 
argument on this point as parallel to Raz's, see p. 280, it is Raz's version of non­
incorporationism which poses the most important challenge. 
21. Three of Dworkin's essays are particularly important in this regard. See RONALD 
DwoRKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING Rrmrrs SERIOUSLY, supra, at 81; Ronald A. Dworkin, 
1726 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1722 
argued Dworkin, judges characteristically make use of norms that 
appear both to be legal, in some important sense, and also to have 
significant moral content.22 Dworkin, for example, has made much 
of the case of Riggs v. Palmer,23 in which the New York Court of 
Appeals upheld a challenge to an otherwise valid will on the 
grounds that the will's main beneficiary had murdered the testator 
to prevent him from changing the will. In its decision, the court 
relied on what it called a "maxim" of the common law, "no one 
shall be permitted . . .  to take advantage of his own wrong,"24 as 
grounds for allowing the challenge to the murderer's claim. What 
the court called a maxim, Dworkin called a principle, but his funda­
mental claim was of course substantive rather than terminological. 
The law, he argued, is well-stocked with such principles, and while 
they express fundamental moral claims, they are also an important 
component of the reasoning by judges in cases that establish rights 
and liabilities.25 Thus, on the one hand they are moral principles 
and yet on the other hand they also appear to be legal - they are 
principles of law, in some nontrivial sense of that word. Thus, 
Dworkin argued, such principles challenge positivism, at least as 
along the lines suggested by Austin and H.L.A. Hart. 
In responding to this challenge, positivists have split into two 
camps, each camp offering a different solution to the problem of 
principles. The exclusivist position owes principally, as I have said, 
to Joseph Raz. On Raz's view, while moral principles can play an 
important role in judicial decisions, they do not really become part 
of the legal system. Their role, as Raz sees it, is that of an outsider, 
an alien presence. Principles are used or borrowed by the deciding 
court, just as a Michigan court would use or borrow the law of Cali­
fornia in order to decide a controversy where the applicable "con­
flicts" rules of decision conclude that the dispute is governed by the 
law of California: 
Suppose that the law requires that unregulated disputes (i.e. those 
with respect to which the law is unsettled) be determined on the basis 
of moral considerations (or a certain subclass of them, such as consid­
erations of justice or moral considerations not fundamentally at odds 
with social morality) . . . . To conform to [exclusivism] we will have to 
say that while the rule referring to morality is indeed law (it is deter­
mined by its sources) the morality to which it refers is not thereby 
"Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 165 (1982); RoNALD DwoRKIN, The Model of 
Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (rev. ed. 1978). 
22. See DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, supra note 21, at 22-23. 
23. See id. at 23 (discussing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (1889)). 
24. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190, quoted in DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, supra note 21, at 23. 
25. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Model of Rules I, supra note 21, at 22, 28-31; see also 
Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra note 21 at 90-94, 105-23; Dworkin "Natural" Law Revisited, 
supra note 21, at 165-66, 169-73. 
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incorporated into law. The rule is analogous to a 'conflict of law' rule 
imposing a duty to apply a foreign system which remains independent 
of and outside the municipal law.26 
So, properly regarded, such principles are no challenge at all. 
It is important to observe that Raz's exclusion of principles is 
not motivated by his adherence to the separability thesis. His 
approach to positivism goes so far as to relegate that thesis to a 
secondary importance; indeed, at times he seems to abandon it alto­
gether. 21 Instead, Raz argues that positivism's central commitment 
is to something he calls the sources thesis, which holds "that the 
existence and content of every law is fully determined by social 
sources."28 The "sources" of a law are "those facts by virtue of 
which it is valid and which identify its content,"29 and Raz contends 
that it is a constraint on the adequacy of any theory of law that its 
test for validity and identification of law depend "exclusively on 
facts of human behaviour capable of being described in value­
neutral terms, and applied without resort to moral argument. "30 
Moral principles, he holds, cannot meet that requirement.31 
In contrast, the incorporationist approach to positivism accepts 
moral principles as properly legal, at least in those instances where 
the moral principle has been "incorporated" by some affirmative 
legal act, practice, or provision. So, for example, the Due Process 
Clause of the Constitution may require judges to reason morally 
about the actions of the state, but it is not the morality of that 
clause or of the attendant judicial decisions that make it law; 
instead, what makes the Clause law is just the fact that it is part of 
the Constitution. 32 Thus, argue the incorporationists, it is the fact 
that the Clause was included in the Constitution that determines its 
legal validity, not its moral truth or falsity. This means that law, in 
any particular jurisdiction, could be moral or not, depending on the 
facts of that jurisdiction's law - namely, what has or has not been 
incorporated. Thus, for example, the same reasons that make the 
Due Process Clause legally valid would also bear on the legal valid­
ity, before the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, of Article 
26. JosEPH RAZ, Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law, in THE AurHoRITY OF LAW 
37, 45-46 (Oxford University Press, 1979) (footnote omitted). 
27. See id. at 38-39 (stating that the social thesis leaves open the question "whether or not 
those social facts by which we identify the law or determine its existence do or do not endow 
it with moral merit If they do, it bas of necessity a moral character"). As I argue later, one 
crucial, but unappreciated question in the debate about the separability thesis is whether 
law's putative connection with morality holds for each individual law, for the legal system as 
a whole or only for certain essential processes of law. See infra text accompanying note 66. 
28. Raz, supra note 26, at 46. 
29. Id. at 47-48. 
30. Id. at 39-40. 
31. Id. at 40. 
32. See Hart, Positivism, supra note 4, at 599; Coleman, supra note 13, at 295. 
1728 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1722 
IV's morally repugnant Fugitive Slave Clause and Article I's infa­
mous provision that counted slaves as only three-fifths of a person. 
In sum, where an exclusivist holds that moral principles cannot 
properly be regarded as part of law, an incorporationist can accept 
such principles as properly legal. As Raz observes, incorporation­
ism is compatible with the prospect that the identification of some 
laws will tum on moral argument, but exclusivism rejects that pos­
sibility.33 Moreover, behind this specific issue lies a larger question 
about the core nature of legal positivism. Incorporationism identi­
fies the separability thesis as positivism's central claim, but exclusiv­
ism treats the sources thesis as its foundation instead.34 
It should be clear from the earlier discussion why incorporation­
ism is so vital to Sebok. The Legal Process theory of adjudication, 
much like Dworkin's,35 countenances the prospect that moral prin­
ciples might be part of the law and not merely sources of law: deci­
sions made according to such principles can, in the appropriate 
circumstances, be regarded as genuinely legal decisions, and the 
conclusions derived therefrom can be regarded as valid legal rul­
ings. So, if moral principles may be part of our law, then Sebok 
needs incorporationism to preserve the claim that the Legal Process 
school continued and extended the twentieth century legacy of 
positivism. 
Sebok's argument on this issue is, not surprisingly, an expansion 
of Coleman's approach. To appreciate this position requires that 
we understand, at least in its basics, the nonincorporationist 
response. Raz is of course perfectly aware of salient instances, like 
the Due Process Clause, where legal systems appear to have incor­
porated moral norms. Why then would he advocate instead this 
rather byzantine idea whereby moral norms are only referred to by 
the law and not included in it? As Raz sees it, including moral prin­
ciples as part of the law would undermine various of the functions 
that legal systems should perform. The chief problem with moral 
principles, in the exclusivist's view, seems to be the inherently con­
troversial nature of such principles. Because moral issues are so 
controversial, judges will not be seen as basing their decisions on 
something "objective." Judicial decisions based on such controver­
sial principles will not be perceived as both settled and 
independent and hence will not fulfill their function of settling dis­
putes. Moreover, morality seems to be "insatiable" in that it seems 
33. See RAz, Legal Positivism, supra note 26, at 47. 
34. Compare, e.g., Coleman, supra note 13, at 287 with RAz, Legal Positivism, supra note 
26, at 41. 
35. I have argued elsewhere that Dworkin's theory of adjudication, at least as expressed 
in his early writings, is much the same as Hart and Sacks's. See Vmcent A. Wellman, 
Dworkin and the Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 Aruz. L. REv. 413 
(1987). 
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difficult to incorporate a moral principle into a system of reasoning 
without including all of morality. If so, then judicial decisions based 
on moral principles threaten any sense of the autonomy of law: law 
can no longer be expected to serve as a distinct realm of decision­
making, it must instead be continuous with moral reasoning more 
generally. Judges, as a result, are no longer officials of the legal 
system with limited powers, but rather all-encompassing moral 
arbiters. 
Following Coleman, Sebok argues that the criteria for judicial 
decisionmaking are all subject to the rule of recognition: the 
organizing precept that, in any given legal system, validates the 
rules which legal officials will treat as binding. The rule of recogni­
tion, Coleman contends, is a matter of convergent social behavior 
by the legal system's officials, including its judges.36 This means, as 
Sebok describes it, that one legal system's rule of recognition could 
both include moral principles and recognize what Sebok calls "in­
terpretation rules" as part of its law (pp. 307-12). Glossing over the 
intricacies, the basic point is that these interpretation rules can con­
strain the way judges in a given legal system apply moral principles 
or balance them off against other values of the legal system. Moral­
ity, as used in legal decisionmaking, is not necessarily insatiable, nor 
controversial beyond the capacity of law to settle legal disputes. 
And so, incorporationism is sustained. 
While I am generally sympathetic to incorporationism, I am 
unsatisfied by this answer. In the first place, it seems to miss the 
point of incorporationism, because it ultimately denies the morality 
of moral principles. This issue raises deep questions about the 
nature of morality, but the idea of a moral principle seems to re­
quire that the consequences of a principle, taken by itself, must 
themselves be moral. That is, if I claim to be applying a moral prin­
ciple (and if no other principles or values are in play) then my an­
swer must, at a minimum, be morally acceptable; conversely, if the 
conclusions I draw from a given moral principle are not morally 
acceptable, then I am applying something other than the principle I 
claim to employ. But Sebok's interpretation rules violate this 
requirement. 
[F]aimess does not have an a priori legal meaning, even if it does 
have a determinate but contested meaning to the Rawlsian and the 
utilitarian. [H.L.A.] Hart argued that under the English and 
American legal systems the rule of interpretation concerning legisla­
tive supremacy often directs a judge to identify a legal fact notwith­
standing the judge's own convictions. We should assume that there 
are rules of interpretation concerning moral values that also direct a 
judge to identify the "legal" meaning of words like fairness, notwith-
36. See Coleman, supra note 13, at 289-96. 
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standing the judge's conviction of what fairness really means, all 
things considered. [p. 307] 
As I read this argument, what's doing the work is the idea that the 
legal meaning of a particular norm can be different from the norm's 
meaning outside the particular legal system. Put differently, it is the 
legal system's rule of recognition which, by use of the rules of inter­
pretation, will determine the application of the moral norm. But, if 
the moral norm's application in a given legal system is determined 
by something other than valid moral reasoning (assuming still that 
the only norm at issue is the moral principle) then the norm is no 
longer a moral norm. In sum, Sebok's solution seems ultimately to 
become a kind of nonincorporationist response, because ultimately 
there are no moral principles at work, only legal ones. 
I'm also troubled by this argument because it seems unnecessary 
for Sebok's overall project. As was noted earlier,37 Sebok's argu­
ment about twentieth-century American legal theory depends cru­
cially on the theory of adjudication that was advanced by Henry 
Hart and Albert Sacks, because their theory countenances princi­
ples as part of the law to be applied by judges in important legal 
decisions. The picture of law advanced by Hart and Sacks is one in 
which there are various values at work in the legal system - some 
of them perhaps moral and others likely not. Adjudication, at least 
in common law systems like our own, may require the application 
of these values, but it misreads the Legal Process theory to think 
that only one such value will be relevant or applicable to a contro­
versial decision. To the contrary, important cases may require 
judges to weigh competing values - principles against policies and 
against other principles.38 But, if adjudication can involve the 
weighing of competing principles, or more generally of competing 
values, then I see no reason why this feature of judicial decision­
making should be different if some, but not all, of the legal system's 
values are moral. In any given case, where multiple and competing 
values bear on a particular decision, the court may decide to 
advance one value, because of the balance of reasons, but the value 
advanced need not be the moral one. The resulting model of judi-
37. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
38. Dworkin's view of principles and policies reflects this feature of adjudication: princi­
ples are logically different from rules, he argues, because principles have a "dimension of 
weight or importance. When principles intersect {the policy of protecting automobile con­
sumers intersecting with principles of freedom of contract, for example), one who must 
resolve the conflict has to take into account the relative weight of each." DwoRKIN, The 
Model of Rules I, supra note 21, at 26. The logical difference between rules and principles, as 
Dworkin describes it, has a further consequence as well. The fact that a given principle 
applies to a controversy does not require that the judicial decision must adhere to that princi­
ple. "We say that our law respects the principle that no man may profit from his own wrong, 
but we do not mean that the law never permits a man to profit from wrongs he commits." Id. 
at 25. As a result, a principle "states a reason that argues in one direction, but does not 
necessitate a particular decision." Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
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cial decisionmaking will, of course, produce results which are not 
moral, but for a positivist that is just as is to be expected: positivism 
does not require that the set of legal decisions be moral. So, 
incorporationism can be cavalier about including moral principles 
in the law, or even in the rule of recognition, so long as there are 
other values at work as well, nonmoral but nonetheless weighty.39 
I have made the point in terms of common law reasoning, which 
involves reasoning from valid rules and norms rather than reason­
ing from the rule of recognition to identify or validate rules or 
norms. But, by hypothesis, the incorporationist accepts that the 
rule of recognition can include values amongst its provisions - if 
not, moral validity would pose no issue for the incorporationist 
theory. So, if the rule of recognition can include moral values, it 
can include others as well and, the incorporationist may argue, 
could require that nonmoral values sometimes count more than 
moral ones in the identification as well as in the application of law. 
Incorporationism, in other words, is not threatened by insatiability, 
so long as the Legal Process theory of adjudication can be 
sustained. 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN 
LEGAL THEORY 
Sebok's argument about the intellectual history of positivism is 
almost dialectical in its structure, although he does not invoke that 
concept or its terminology.40 As he views it, American legal theory 
39. Sebok's discussion of this point is considerably more involved than I have, or possibly 
could have, presented in this review. Its central feature depends on an argument about what 
he terms the "insatiability" of moral reasoning, a point that he employs both in his discussion 
of incorporationism, pp. 294-307, and also in his argument about certain versions of constitu­
tional interpretation that see the Supreme Court as advancing "fundamental rights." See pp. 
259-66; see also infra note 64. The issue is complex, but my disagreement with Sebok on the 
nature of adjudication springs, in part, from my rejection of his insatiability argument. 
Stripped to its essentials, Sebok's argument is this: any normative system with an insatiable 
concept - like that of justice - will become a monistic system of practical reasoning, in 
which all decisions will be measured against that insatiable concept. See pp. 260-64. Monism, 
as he means it, "assumes not only that the choices one makes can be ranked but also that 
one's reasons are comparable along a common metric." P. 262. Now, it seems plain to me 
that whatever may be the case for constitutional interpretation, the common law as we know 
it defies easy categorization along these lines - sometimes appearing monistic and some­
times not. But the real point goes to insatiability: insatiability of the sort that bothers Sebok 
requires monism, rather than producing it. As a consequence, we can understand how legal 
systems can block insatiability: any system of law which is not independently committed to 
producing the morally right answer in every controversy can be comfortable advancing other 
values as well as morality. Thus, legal reasoning does not necessarily respect the insatiability 
of moral norms like justice or fairness. To the contrary, a given legal system can instead 
advance other values, sometimes at the expense of justice or fairness or the like. 
40. The following description of the structure of Sebok's argument is, of course, an utter 
bowdlerization of Hegel's complex and arcane argument for the phenomenological develop­
ment of "spirit." Hegel's view, in all its intricacy and obscurity, can be found in G.W.F. 
HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND (J.B. Baillie trans. 1967). 
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of the past hundred or so years has involved the struggle of an idea 
- legal positivism - to express itself. It was initially expressed, 
albeit incompletely, at the end of the nineteenth century by writers 
who were influenced by Austin. Then, the idea confronted another 
opposing idea, and in reaction to that opposition was ultimately 
transformed into something different (and better) than its earlier 
manifestation. Then, having been transformed, positivism again 
confronted an opposite idea and again overcame it through yet 
another transformation. This second dynamic of thesis and antithe­
sis, followed by synthesis, begins with the Legal Process school and 
the "reasoned elaborationists" of the 1950s, and leads us through 
the twists and turns both of conservative critics like Herbert Wechs­
ler and Robert Bork, and of natural law theorists like David Rich­
ards and Ronald Dworkin, until we arrive at the current moment in 
intellectual history.41 
A. 
The first phase of this story involves the familiar topics of for­
malism and American Legal Realism, but Sebok's examination of 
these ideas yields some surprising conclusions. In the beginning, he 
contends, positivism was brought to the American legal experience 
through the influence of the scholars who are now so often deni­
grated as formalists. 42 Upon closer analysis, these writers - most 
saliently, Christopher Langdell (pp. 83-97) and Joseph Beale (pp. 
97-104) - turn out to be positivists in their views about the nature 
of law and what makes it authoritative. But the formalists were 
hamstrung by a woefully inadequate theory of adjudication; this 
early version of positivism could not conceive of a mechanism by 
which to control judicial discretion and so it espoused instead a 
vision of law that left judges little discretion to reconsider the rules 
of law they sought to apply. Because their theory of adjudication 
41. Indeed, Sebok's own characterization of the debate between incorporationism and its 
critics is couched in much the same terms. The triumph of incorporationism, which he calls 
the "New Positivism," also involves three stages: 
Frrst, there was the "founding," which took place . . .  through the publication of H.L.A. 
Hart's The Concept of Law. Hart set out the essential principles of the New Positivism, 
and much of the conflict among subsequent New Positivists has been over the proper 
interpretation of his legacy. The second stage was the critique of Hart's positivism by 
Dworkin. Dworkin was a critical player . . .  because his restatement of Hart's theory -
for no other purpose than to criticize it - has been very influential among Hart's later 
defenders. The final stage, which began in the early 1970s and is still unfolding, involves 
efforts by New Positivists to answer Dworkin and refine Hart's work. 
P. 268. 
42. "Formalism" is, of course, another of those words that is commonly used as a pejora­
tive, to the point where many have wondered if there is any real content to the term, or any 
real reference. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Model of Rules I, supra note 21, at 15-16 ("[A]ll 
specimens (of mechanical jurisprudents that have been] captured - even Blackstone and 
Joseph Beale - have had to be released after careful reading of their texts."). Sebok pro­
vides a long discussion of the different strands of criticism of formalism. See pp. 48-60. 
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was so unsatisfactory, the formalists were belittled first by Holmes 
(pp. 60-75), then Pound (pp. 32-39), and then the Realists (pp. 75-
83, 104-12). The Realists themselves faced criticism by writers sueh 
as Lon Fuller who were appalled by Nazi Germany's corruption of 
law into an instrument for tyranny and oppression. Fuller held no 
brief for the Realists, but he joined with them in scorning the ear­
lier formalists.43 As a result, reviled by both the Realists and their 
successors, positivism (in its formalist guise) fell into disrepute. 
Before reading Sebok, I had largely supposed that the formalists 
were unthinking adherents of a kind of simpleminded natural law 
position. I had supposed this because I had also assumed that 
American Legal Realism was dominated by Holmes' view of the 
nature of law: since Holmes espoused a version of the separability 
thesis,44 I therefore assumed that Holmes should be read as a posi­
tivist, and hence, so should the Realists who, following in his foot­
steps, criticized the formalists on many of the same grounds. As a 
result, when it came to assessing formalism, I was inclined to con­
trast the formalists with what I assumed to be the positivism of their 
most vocal critics and accordingly to infer that the formalists must 
be aligned with natural law. My easy and unreflective path through 
these issues was no doubt aided by my uncritical adoption of Grant 
Gilmore's famous characterization of Langdell as rigid, doctrinaire, 
and essentially stupid.45 Sebok's close and careful examination of 
both Holmes and his formalist targets, Langdell and Beale, leads 
me to reconsider each and every one of these views. Langdell, in 
particular, is rehabilitated into an interesting and reflective thinker 
about the nature of law (pp. 86-97) and not at all the shallow pedant 
that I had supposed him to be. 
At one level, Sebok's conclusions about these familiar topics are 
surprising. But at another, they are intuitively satisfying. First and 
foremost, Sebok's analysis of Holmes and Langdell reminds me that 
these are complex figures, with complicated views that cannot easily 
be reduced to adherence or rejection of a few basic propositions. 
Consider, in this connection, the position of Holmes. It is true that 
Holmes denied that law was conceptually connected with morality, 
and this denial means that he was to that extent a positivist. But 
Holmes's embrace of the separability thesis, according to Sebok, 
had more to do with his skepticism about morality than with a well­
thought-out position about the nature of law (p. 68). And, in every 
other respect, Holmes rejected the core tenets of Austinian positiv-
43. See Fuller, supra note 2. 
44. See pp. 67-69 (discussing Holmes' acceptance of the separability thesis); O.W. 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459-60 (1897). 
45. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CoNTRAcr 13-15, 106-07 (Ronald K.L. Collins 
ed., 2d ed. 1995). 
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ism (pp. 67-68). So, classifying Holmes as positivist is too facile 
and, as a result, misleading, especially when it comes to thinking 
about the views of his Realist successors. 
Sebok characterizes positivism as resting on a tripod of funda­
mental tenets which were first articulated by Austin and Bentham. 
The first of these is the separability thesis (already noted): the claim 
"that there is no necessary connection between law and [morality]" 
(p. 30). Second is the command theory, Austin's (and to some 
extent Bentham's) argument that all laws are, at bottom, the com­
mand of the sovereign (p. 31). Later positivists, such as Kelsen and 
H.L.A. Hart, rejected the particular details of this theory. But, 
their respective theories of the nature of law - requiring, in Kel­
sen's case, a Grundnorm, that both identified the particular norms 
of a legal system and engendered their validity,46 and, in Hart's 
case, a rule of recognition that both identified and validated the 
legal system's other rules47 - can be seen to "depersonalize" the 
command theory. In effect, Kelsen and Hart analyzed law as deriv­
able not from a distinct person of overweening power but instead 
from an organizing precept which could play a comparable role in 
establishing and maintaining a system of law. Finally, there is what 
Sebok calls the sources thesis (pp. 31-32). In point of fact, Sebok's 
version of this particular idea differs importantly from Raz's and 
would be more usefully termed the "social" thesis.48 The core idea, 
as Sebok develops it, is that each rule (or norm) of law must be 
traceable to some identifiable social source (pp. 31-32, 106-07, 159). 
In Austin's theory, that source was the will of the determinate sov­
ereign and the social fact that the sovereign was owed a habit of 
obedience by the bulk of the populace, 49 but in Hart's version of 
positivism, the relevant social fact would be the acceptance of the 
rule of recognition by the officials of the legal system.50 
Viewing the formalists and their realist critics through this 
three-part analysis,51 Sebok concludes that the formalists were the 
46. See, e.g., HANs KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STA1E 110-24 and passim. 
47. See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 4, at 91-93, 95-107. 
48. See infra note 51. The distinction between the sources thesis and the social thesis 
derives from Raz's work. See Raz, supra note 26. 
49. See JoHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JurusPRUDENCE DETERMINED 6-20, 199-212 
(1984). 
50. See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 4, at 111-14. 
51. There is a deeper difficulty with Sebok's argument on this point - just who should 
and should not count as a positivist. In his eyes, both the formalists and later the Legal 
Process school were positivists because, in each case, they accepted positivism's three key 
tenets - the separability thesis, the command theory (or its modem-day counterpart) and 
the sources thesis. But, this argument papers over a deep and unresolved tension amongst 
these tenets, as least as understood by the main disputants. Coleman, for example, under­
stands positivism to involve the separability thesis and the rule of recognition (H.L.A. Hart's 
counterpart to the command theory), but he rejects the sources thesis, at least as Raz has 
advanced it. See Coleman, supra note 13, at 305-08. Raz, on the other hand, understands 
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adherents of positivism, although misguided in their picture of adju­
dication (pp. 104-11). Through a careful analysis of the writings of 
Langdell, for example, he argues that Langdell accepted each leg of 
this tripod (pp. 83-97). Holmes, on the other hand, embraced only 
the separability thesis, and identifying him as a positivist is accord­
ingly inaccurate (pp. 67-68). Finally, the Realists, while often 
unclear about many of their views, were led away from positivism 
by their rejection of formalism's theory of adjudication; they em­
braced none of positivism's core tenets and, at times, rejected some 
of them outright. The criticisms levelled at the formalists varied 
with their different critics but, in Sebok's eyes, the most insightful 
of these critics was Lon Fuller, who scorned formalism just because 
it rejected any enduring connection between law and morality (pp. 
20-24). That is, Fuller recognized that formalism was based on 
something like the separability thesis and rejected it for just that 
reason. So, when Fuller began in the 1940s to espouse his distinct 
version of natural law, hard on the heels of realism's crusade, he 
both represented, in Sebok's view, the culmination of the earlier 
criticisms of formalism (p. 20) and also confirmed the characteriza­
tion of formalism as fundamentally positivistic (p. 42). 
Second, Sebok has reminded me to be wary of accepting any 
view of intellectual history that was propounded by those who were 
on only one side of an important debate. Consider, in this connec-
positivism to require the sources thesis, but abjures the separability thesis. In particular, Raz 
acknowledges, positivism as he understands it is consistent with certain kinds of necessary 
connections between law and morality. In terms of the point made earlier, the sources thesis 
might lead to denying any necessary connection between morality and each rule of law, or 
each judicial decision, but does not foreclose some deep connection between morality and 
the legal system, taken as a whole. 
Some part of the difficulty here is terminological. Raz developed his idea of the sources 
thesis by building from a related, but less aggressive position that he termed the social thesis. 
This he defined as being the claim "that what is law and what is not is a matter of social fact." 
Raz, supra note 26, at 37. As Raz develops the argument, the social thesis has both strong 
and weak versions, and the weak version is compatible with the claim, "[s]ometimes the 
identification of some laws turns on moral arguments." Id. at 47. Moreover, the strong social 
thesis, which Raz renames the sources thesis, excludes that statement. See id. In other words, 
the weak social thesis is consistent with incorporationism, but the sources thesis is not. The 
social thesis seems to be much closer to Sebok's version of the sources thesis, but the differ­
ence is important. So, Sebok has clouded the picture by using Raz's crucial term in a manner 
somewhat inconsistent with Raz's own development. But, the problem goes beyond mere 
terminology. To make his argument that the formalists, for example, were misunderstood 
advocates of positivism, Sebok needs an initial characterization of who is, and who is not, 
properly to be understood as a positivist. And, in order to be illuminating, Sebok's initial 
characterization of positivism needs to straddle the important dichotomy between 
incorporationism and nonincorporationism - he would beg the question about who really 
was a positivist if his test for positivism adopted only the incorporationist's definition, or the 
nonincorporationist's. So, it makes sense that his initial characterization should include fea­
tures of both camps, if those features can be used consistently together. See, e.g., Coleman & 
Leiter, supra note 17. But the "sources" thesis is so intimately tied to Raz's version of 
(nonincorporationist) positivism, and the separability thesis is now so tied to Coleman's alter­
nate approach, that it is disquieting to see them amalgamated together, without an attending 
acknowledgment. 
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tion, the case of Lochner v. New York,52 often derided as the quin­
tessential "formalist" opinion.53 There the Supreme Court 
invalidated a New York law on the grounds that it violated a norm 
of freedom of contract, which was assumed by the majority to be 
enshrined in the Constitution. Descriptions of Lochner's formalism 
have always seemed too pat to me, although I seldom paused to 
wonder why. A common strand of criticism decries Lochner's for­
malist majority as either knaves or fools. On the one hand, the 
(knavish) majority is to be scorned because it decided the case as it 
did on the basis of a conservative economic policy but "hid" the 
"true" reasons for its decision. In other words, Lochner was wrong 
because it was antiprogressive in its social policy, but the majority 
lacked the courage of its convictions. On the other hand, the (fool­
ish) majority is to be mocked because it supposedly believed, of 
course wrongly, that it did not have any choice about its decision, 
that it was duty-bound to apply the constitutional norm of freedom 
of contract, notwithstanding the policy preferences of the people of 
New York. 
I am no fan of formalism, nor of Lochner, but this dual criticism 
has always bothered me, for several reasons, not the least of which 
is its self-contradictoriness: if the majority was foolish in its belief 
that it could only advance the norms already enshrined in the 
Constitution, then it could not also be knavish for hiding its view of 
economic policy. Moreover, each branch of this criticism was itself 
unsatisfying. For instance, how could the knavish majority have 
thought to hide its true reasons when Holmes, in his ringing dissent 
in the same case, so clearly revealed the supposedly "hidden" mis­
sion of imposing on us Herbert Spenser's laissez-faire social philos­
ophy?54 And, even more important, how can the majority's policy 
preferences be held to be so wrong-headed unless we have a robust 
theory of constitutional interpretation which establishes a constitu­
tional mandate to further the opposing, progressive, policies? 
What is perhaps most important for Sebok's overall argument is 
the manner in which the Realists proceeded to oppose formalism, 
because he contends that the Realist's campaign against positivism 
presaged the later hijacking of positivism's second incarnation, the 
Legal Process tradition. In the Realists' portrayal, positivism was 
burdened, as Sebok phrases it, with excess "theoretical baggage" (p. 
18). First, the Realists painted a misleading picture of Langdell and 
Beale and accused them of promoting certain conservative values, 
at the expense of an honest, and more "realistic" picture of law. 
52. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
53. See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, PATIERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 9·64 (1995) (ar­
ticulating different strands of realist criticism of Lochner). 
54. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
May 1999] Positivism 1737 
Tb.en, aided by Fuller, the Realists also conflated the formalists' 
essential positivism with their mistaken theory of adjudication. 
Thus portrayed as both conservative and obtuse, positivism lan­
guished until two developments in the 1950s: H.L.A. Hart's 1958 
essay (written after he had spent a year at the Harvard Law School, 
debating some of these issues with Lon Fuller and Henry Hart), and 
the emergence (also at the Harvard Law School) of the theory of 
"reasoned elaborationism" and its theoretical underpinnings in 
Hart and Sacks's manuscript. 
B. 
The second phase of positivism's emergence was brought about 
by the Legal Process school of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. I 
welcome Sebok's analysis because I have long been of the opinion 
that the Legal Process school is a rich and insightful approach to the 
problems of a theory of adjudication. In my view, the Legal Process 
school is the dominant theory of adjudication in American law, 
although Hart and Sacks are not often credited for their contribu­
tions. Accordingly, I have been both baffled and frustrated by the 
way in which they are so often dismissed as relics of a former epoch. 
Sebok's analysis helps explain why. 
In Sebok's telling of the story, Hart and Sacks provide what pos­
itivism's early versions lacked: an adequate theory of adjudication. 
Formalism was hamstrung by a need to see law as consisting pri­
marily of rules; this meant that formalists could not easily explain 
judicial decisions - so prominent in the common law but also 
increasingly apparent in constitutional interpretation - where the 
deciding court reasoned about which rule to adopt or ab.out how to 
reshape an old rule to meet changes in the social or political cli­
mate. Formalism's deficiencies on just this point made it an easy 
target for its critics. Hart and Sacks provided a theory to rebut the 
Realists' skepticism about judicial decisionmaking without falling 
back into the errors of formalism. 
The chief contribution of the Legal Process school is to under­
stand that law can consist of more than just rules. More precisely, 
Hart and Sacks saw that law, as we find it in our own legal system, 
includes different and distinct elements. First, there are rules · 
(which are familiar enough) and, relatedly, what Hart and Sacks 
call "standards," rule-like norms which make use of open-ended cri­
teria like "reasonableness" or "due care." These norms operate, as 
it were, on the surface of legal reasoning: we can observe that most 
judicial decisions involve the identification of a rule or standard and 
its application to the controversy at hand. But Hart and Sacks 
observed that other types of norms are also at work in judicial 
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decisionmaking: what they called "principles" and "policies."SS 
The distinction between principles and policies can be elusive, but 
what's salient is the idea that principles and policies are values that, 
according to the Legal Process school, are part of the law. 
Recognizing principles and policies as legal values accomplishes 
two important things for the development of an adequate theory of 
adjudication. First, in Sebok's terms, it accommodates judicial dis­
cretion. Put differently, it means that valid legal decisions can be 
other than mechanical: judges can, and will, shape their decisions 
to further the values which are, on this theory, part of the law. In­
cluding principles and policies in the body of law allows courts to 
render creative decisions, in that judges may appropriately revisit 
the legal system's norms, rethink the appropriateness of any partic­
ular norm, and, in the appropriate case, legitimately craft new solu­
tions to problems faced by the legal system. Indeed, including 
principles and policies in our understanding of the law means that 
in some cases, at least, judges are required to be creative: where 
the previously acknowledged rule or standard no longer serves the 
underlying values, the law (taken as a whole) requires the deciding 
court to change the norm. 
Second, such decisions are legally valid, because they are 
instances of judges applying the law and not just advancing their 
own personal policy choices. Hart and Sacks's picture of adjudica­
tion embraces the idea that values (whether moral or other)S6 are 
part of the law; what is equally important is the idea that these val­
ues constrain judicial decisionmaking. "Underlying every rule and 
standard . . . is at the least a policy and in most cases a principle. 
This principle or policy is always available to guide judgment in 
resolving uncertainties" about the meaning of the rule or stan­
dard.57 Rules and standards are understood in this picture as based 
on the legal system's values and as justified by those values. So, 
when courts are called upon to assess any particular norm, they do 
so in terms of the relevant principles and policies. If the court is 
called upon to formulate a rule for inclusion in the legal system, 
then the rule that should be formulated is the rule that best serves 
the principles and policies of that area of the law. As a result, 
including principles and policies means that such nonmechanical 
decisions are nonetheless legally valid. Conversely, if the court is 
called upon to examine a problematic rule, or to modify it, or to 
55. See TLP, supra note 14, at 139-43. 
56. Hart and Sacks do not argue, in anything like a systematic fashion, that the values 
which are embodied in legal principles or policies are necessarily moral. But they seem to 
countenance the possibility that some of their examples - like the principle that no one 
should be unjustly enriched - either express or reflect the kinds of values that would 
standardly be thought as moral. 
57. TLP, supra note 14, at 148. 
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replace it with a more appropriate norm, the court's examination 
should address the question whether that norm is still justified by 
the relevant values. 
In sum, Hart and Sacks's theory of adjudication provides the 
kind of solution that, according to Sebok, lies at the heart of positiv­
ism: to accommodate and control judicial discretion. This conclu­
sion, in turn, prompts the inevitable question: if, as Sebok and I 
both believe, the Legal Process theory is so insightful and so deserv­
ing of attention, why has it received so little recognition? 
The answer is multifaceted, and fascinating. In the first place, 
there is the strange history of the manuscript itself. Developed by 
Hart and Sacks as a teaching vehicle across a span of several years, 
it reached its final, but incomplete stage in their 1958 manuscript. 
Thereafter, it was used by them at the Harvard Law School and by 
professors at other law schools. But, it was never finished and 
never published. For decades, it was only available as duplicated 
pages from the Harvard Law School. Finally, after both Hart's and 
Sacks's death, Bill Eskridge and Philip Frickey undertook to finish 
and publish it. They published in 1994, but they did not finish. As 
they explain in their Introduction, there was no way to revise the 
manuscript, without attempting in effect to rewrite it from the 
beginning. They decided instead to publish the manuscript as it 
stood in the 1958 edition, together with their own substantial com­
mentary on the manuscript's significance. Thus, Hart and Sacks's 
crucial ideas were effectively diminished by the authors' long-term 
inability to complete their project. 
Hart and Sacks's ideas were minimized as well by the nature of 
the authors' ambitions. Although the manuscript includes, early on, 
a substantial essay entitled "Introductory Text Notes on the Nature 
and Function of Law," Hart and Sacks clearly believed that their 
approach to law could only be understood through the effort of 
wrestling with various problems and conundra about the making 
and application of law. As they wrote: 
The technique of reasoned elaboration which courts pursue or ought 
to pursue in the effort to arrive at decisions according to law defies 
any facile generalization which will convey in itself a working under­
standing. These materials seek mainly to arrive at such an under­
standing by grappling with a series of concrete problems of decision 
58 
As a result, the reader is left to extract the most important insights 
from discussions of particularly thorny cases, which are selected and 
accompanied by text and questions which were both more designed 
to be provocative than illuminating. 
58. Id. at 146. 
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To this unfortunate history, Sebok adds two further dimensions. 
First, he argues that the impetus of the Legal Process school was 
"usurped" by various conservative critics of the Supreme Court and 
its activist posture in the 1950s and 1960s (p. 188). In the legal 
world of the 1950s, the most salient event was, of course, not the 
development of Hart and Sacks's ideas but the Supreme Court's 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.59 In 1959, shortly after 
the last version of the Legal Process manuscript, Herbert Wechsler 
gave his now famous lecture, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu­
tional Law, 6o at the same Harvard Law School. Wechsler was criti­
cal of the Brown decision, ostensibly on the grounds that the 
decision failed to articulate "neutral" principles which could serve 
to validate judicial reasoning in other constitutional decisions. On 
the surface, at least, Wechsler's argument resembled the kind of 
perspective on judicial decisionmaking that Hart and Sacks were 
attempting to express: it required that each decision be justified not 
solely by reference to the rightness of its result, but by reference to 
the craft and elegance of the judicial reasoning that led to the con­
clusion. 61 This emphasis on the distinct requirements of profession­
alism and valid reasoning echoed themes that Hart and Sacks had 
each expressed in other writings about the activities of the Supreme 
Court, in addition to their manuscript. As a result, in the minds of 
many, Wechsler was either an adherent of the Legal Process school, 
or at least a fellow traveler, and his criticism of Brown was taken as 
an indication that the Court's activism in challenging racial discrim­
ination was somehow contrary to the core of the Legal Process 
school's theory of adjudication.62 
Regardless of the surface similarities between Wechsler's view 
and Hart and Sacks's, it was a striking non sequitur to associate the 
neutral principles argument with the Legal Process theory of adju­
dication. First and foremost, the Legal Process manuscript did not 
attempt to develop a theory of constitutional adjudication. 
Notwithstanding the exhaustive nature of their discussion of those 
topics they undertook, they never took up constitutional law in any 
systematic way. Second, the overall tenor of Wechsler's remarks -
that the Supreme Court should avoid articulating or enforcing prin­
ciples of constitutional law unless they were appropriately "neutral" 
- was of course inconsistent with the Legal Process school's most 
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
60. Herbert Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REv. 1 {1959). 
61. See, e.g., id. at 15 (asserting that legal reasoning "must be genuinely principled, rest­
ing with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons 
quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved"). 
62. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential 
Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279, 286-91 {1973). 
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fundamental assumptions about the nature of law as consisting of 
values to be served, as well as rules and standards. These values 
could, and in some instances should, lead to dramatic reconfigura­
tions of the rights of others in the society.63 In fact, Sebok argues, 
Wechsler, Bickel, and Bork were fundamentally motivated by a 
skepticism about morality: since moral reasoning was an unreliable 
basis for constitutional decisionmaking, they turned instead to vari­
ous versions of "originalism," in the hopes that the supposedly reli­
able facts about the intent of the Constitution's drafters could 
legitimate constitutional interpretations in a way that moral princi­
ples could not (pp. 191-92, 199-206). And finally, as Sebok demon­
strates, Wechsler's criticisms of Brown were at odds with Sacks's 
own writings, in which he discussed and praised the Supreme 
Court's decision (pp. 122-23). 
Nonetheless, the damage was done. And it was solidified by 
subsequent developments. As Sebok views the story of constitu­
tional law scholarship during the 1960s and 1970s, what Wechsler 
begat was the later, increasingly more conservative, criticisms of 
Supreme Court activism in the scholarship of first Alexander Bickel 
and then Robert Bork. Their increasingly conservative stance 
meant that, more and more, the Legal Process school was assumed 
to be both conservative in its leanings and outdated in its views. 
Finally, the conservative critics of the Supreme Court in tum begat 
an opposing strand of constitutional law scholarship, that of David 
Richards, Tom Grey and, most importantly, Ronald Dworkin, all of 
whom Sebok summarizes under the heading of "fundamental 
rights" theories (pp. 195-96, 217-22). As Sebok explains the dy­
namic, the fundamental rights theorists were led to respond to the 
moral skepticism of the Court's conservative critics (pp. 206-16). 
The rights theorists were joined in their view that constitutional in­
terpretation could meaningfully be founded on substantive moral 
values. Although diverse in their particular arguments, the "funda­
mental rights" theorists converged on a premise that the Court was 
obligated in its constitutional decisions to advance certain basic val­
ues like justice, fairness, or integrity. These writers were led by a 
complex of reasons both to reject positivism and, since they associ­
ated Hart and Sacks with Bickel and Bork, to scorn the Legal Pro­
cess school in particular. And so, the cycle was repeated: the 
positivism of Hart and Sacks was tarred with a conservative brush 
and then ultimately criticized and rejected by those who sought to 
repudiate the supposed conservativism. 
63. See, e.g., TLP, supra note 14, at 93-94 (discussing Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 
1889)) and at 357 (discussing Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me. R.R., 1 Gray 263 (1854)). 
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FnTING THE PIECES TOGETHER? 
Sebok's reevaluation of Hart and Sacks's fall from grace in 
American legal theory and his reassessment of their views are sub­
stantial contributions to our understanding of American legal 
theory. Similarly, his discussion of the dispute between incorpora­
tionism and exclusivism and his emendation of Coleman's argument 
are noteworthy, taken on their own. These arguments seem, how­
ever, to be logically independent of one another: Hart and Sacks 
were misread, and underappreciated, whether or not incorporation­
ism is a better theory of the role of moral principles in the law, and 
the adequacy of incorporationism does not seem to depend on our 
preference for the Legal Process school's theory of adjudication. 
What more does Sebok see in these topics that leads him to link 
them together in this kind of sustained inquiry? His project some­
how requires that these two arguments fit together so as to com­
plete the argument about positivism's reemergence, fitter and more 
sophisticated, from its various challenges. Unfortunately, what 
remains unclear is the connection that Sebok sees between these 
two facets of his argument. Nor is it clear that he succeeds in estab­
lishing such a connection, whatever it may be. 
For example, it is somehow important to his grander enterprise 
that Sebok argue not only that Hart and Sacks's is a satisfactory and 
insightful theory of adjudication, but further that they were truly 
positivists in their thinking. As I see it, however, this more ambi­
tious argument is unsuccessful. 
To begin with, this construal of the Legal Process manuscript 
goes against the grain. Sebok's argument minimizes just how paro­
chial Hart and Sacks were in their argument. At the level of philos­
ophy of law, the aim of any good theory is to explain the features of 
law in whatever form we might encounter it. Accordingly, a satis­
factory philosophical account of law must range over legal systems 
in a variety of political contexts - monarchies and dictatorships as 
well as democracies. It must also subsume legal systems of varying 
structures and complexity - civil law as well as common law tradi­
tions, together with socialist legal systems and primitive legal orders 
where one authoritative person makes, interprets, and adjudicates 
the law. The Legal Process attempts none of this universality. To 
the contrary, Hart and Sacks examine only those legal systems, such 
as our own, that come within the Anglo-American tradition. In­
deed, to a very great extent, they are unconcerned with anything 
about lawmaking and application other than adjudication, and even 
that is mostly limited to judicial decisionmaking. Some sporadic ex­
ceptions notwithstanding, their manuscript is principally the devel­
opment of a theory of adjudication and mostly a theory of 
adjudication for common law systems similar to ours. 
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Secondly, while Sebok argues that The Legal Process conforms 
to his positivistic tripod - separability thesis, command theory, and 
sources thesis - this argument is unpersuasive.64 Consider, as one 
example, his contention that Hart and Sacks embraced the separa­
bility thesis. According to Sebok, this position is revealed in what 
the manuscript calls "the principle of institutional settlement," 
which "requires that a decision which is the due result of duly estab­
lished procedures be accepted whether it is right or wrong - at 
least for the time being."65 The cornerstone of Sebok's argument is 
that institutional settlement entails law's separability from morality, 
for his statement of the principle's definition is immediately fol­
lowed by the conclusion: "Hart and Sacks therefore recognized 
that there is no necessary connection between law and morality and 
therefore embraced a central tenet of legal positivism, the separa­
bility thesis" (p. 130). 
But the separability thesis does not follow from the principle of 
institutional settlement. Among other things, Sebok's argument 
ignores an important issue about the scope of any purported con­
nection between law and morality. One famous, if suspect, version 
of natural law, · often but perhaps inaccurately attributed to Thomas 
Aquinas, holds that "an unjust law is no law at all."66 This version 
of natural law asserts a necessary connection between morality and 
each law of the legal system. But it is difficult to find natural law 
adherents who would argue, in any sustained way, that each law 
must necessarily be moral or just. As an alternative, more contem­
porary examples of natural law can be seen to argue that there is 
some kind of connection between morality and the legal system, 
taken as a whole (as was suggested by Lon Fuller) or between 
64. Pp. 129-38, 159. In one other respect, as well, Sebek has shown a propensity to force 
writers into one camp or another. In his review of the "fundamental rights" version of consti­
tutional interpretation, he distinguishes among different strains of what he labels "epistemic" 
natural law. Pp. 229-34. The point of the analysis is to capture the efforts of theorists like 
David Richards and Ronald Dworkin who want to include in constitutional law substantive 
moral values like justice or fairness, without thereby requiring that each judicial decision 
serve only that value. Sebok argues on the basis of what he calls the "insatiability" of such 
moral values, that each of these weaker versions of epistemic natural law collapses into some­
thing more aggressive, and less plausible, than its adherents would hope. Pp. 234-56. It 
seems to me, however, that this argument outstrips the data, because none of these versions 
of "epistemic" natural law seems to me to be natural law at all. Consider, for example, what 
he calls Almost Strong Epistemic Natural Law, which he defines as follows: "The existence 
of a constitution entails the identification of justice as the source of supreme law." P. 230. 
But this characterization, like his argument about the principle of institutional settlement, 
lacks the required universality. This legal theory, whatever it may be called, makes claims 
only about those legal systems that are built on a constitution, but offers no basis for ex­
tending the argument to other kinds of legal systems. The theory is, therefore, not a natural 
law theory. And the flaws of Almost Strong Epistemic Natural Law hold a fortiori for Not 
Very Strong Epistemic Natural Law, p. 231, and for Weak Epistemic Natural Law, p. 233. · 
65. P. 130 (quoting TLP, supra note 14, at 109). 
66. See, e.g., Brian Bix, ·Natural Law Theory, in A CoMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 17, 223, 226. 
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morality and some essential process of law (as has been argued by 
Ronald Dworkin). Conversely, if natural law can assert a logical 
connection between various kinds of law and morality, then the 
separability thesis's denial of any logical or conceptual connection 
must reach all those possible connections: no necessary connection 
between morality and law, at any level. The principle of institu­
tional settlement, however, cannot by itself establish that there is no 
connection between morality and the legal system. 
A simple example can help here. Suppose the legislature duly 
enacts, and the executive duly signs, a law discriminating against 
persons with red hair, or those of Chaldean descent. Institutional 
settlement requires that the law be "accepted whether it is right or 
wrong - at least for the time being."67 But within our system, it is 
clear that institutional settlement must coexist with our system of 
checks and balances, and so the results of duly established legisla­
tive and executive procedures can yield, after the appropriate fur­
ther process, to decisions by the judiciary. Indeed, for the 
"fundamental rights" theorists that Sebok discussed, it is proper 
that the legislature's duly established procedures might be displaced 
by, or be corrected to become, a morally more satisfying result in 
accord with various fundamental precepts of justice or fairness or 
dignity. More generally, in a system of law which has some alloca­
tion of responsibilities comparable to our own sense of the separa­
tion of powers, the principle of institutional settlement might be 
appealing because one holds that the system as a whole secures 
moral values, even though the actions of different institutions, 
taken individually, might nonetheless be unjust. So, various forms 
of natural law theories could be held consistently with the principle 
of institutional settlement, and the principle thus has not been 
shown to entail the separability thesis. 
I should be clear about the nature of my disagreement with 
Sebok's argument. I view the Legal Process manuscript as, on the 
whole, more positivistic than not.68 And, I certainly join with 
Sebok in rejecting those who interpret Hart and Sacks as commit­
ted, in some deep way, to a natural law position: their parochialism 
vitiates any imputation of a natural law view at least as much as it 
does the contrary argument. My point is that the record does not 
require either interpretation, and accordingly I prefer to leave Hart 
and Sacks out of the traditional philosophical debates about the 
nature of law. 
But this leaves my first question: Why does Sebok feel the need 
to construe Hart and Sacks as postivists? What would be lost from 
67. TLP, supra note 14, at 109. 
68. See Wellman, supra note 35, at 470 ("(1be Legal Process] manuscript . . .  suggests a 
positivistic orientation."). 
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his thesis if the Legal Process school were left as only a theory of 
adjudication and not a theory of the nature of law as well? The 
answer is uncertain, but I can venture one hypothesis. I observed 
earlier that positivism can be thought of as thin or thick and that 
Coleman, following Hart, understood the philosophical position as 
thin. Put differently, Coleman views positivism's philosophical 
claim about the nature of law as independent from the particulars 
of developing an adequate theory of adjudication. Sebok appears 
to disagree; to use his own preferred terminology, he seems to want 
to fatten up positivism into something more than just a theory of 
law. To be sure, he does not profess great ambitions on this point 
- he says only that he argues for a somewhat thicker version than 
does Coleman.69 Two aspects of his enterprise, however, suggest 
otherwise. First, he characterizes positivism's ambitions as larger 
than just the development of a theory of the nature of law. Legal 
positivism, he claims, "tries to understand law as a system of varia­
bly constrained discretion" (p. 17). This goes beyond the thin 
theory, linking the theory of law to a theory of adjudication. And, 
second, if Sebok does not seek a thicker version of positivism, why 
would he attempt to argue for the important connection between 
positivism and the Legal Process school? He could be content, 
instead, simply to appropriate their theory of adjudication as one 
example of a theory which was consistent with incorporationist 
positivism. 
Indeed, the question is worth posing, whatever Sebok's own 
aims might be. After all of Sebok's efforts, just how thin is positiv­
ism, as he argues for it? If Hart and Sacks's theory of adjudication 
is satisfactory, does that tell us that positivism is thicker than 
Coleman might have thought? The answer on this score is still the 
same as Coleman's: positivism appears to be thin, very thin. 
Incorporationism affirms that a theory of adjudication like that of 
Hart and Sacks - one that incorporates moral principles - is still 
positivistic. But it does not require that every legal system must 
treat adjudication along those lines. Hart and Sacks's parochialism, 
as I see it, undermines any claim that their theory of adjudication is 
universal. What's left, then, is two enterprises, not one: a thin 
theory of the nature of law, and a rich and provocative theory of 
adjudication. 
69. See pp. 18-19 (disagreeing with the claim th;:tt positi\rism is only a "semantic" and not 
also an "epistemic" theory of law). 
